Separation of powers is a necessary "bulwark against tyranny"" in part because allowing one branch to wield executive and judicial power would impair the impartial administration of the laws. 2 The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause' requires states to provide an impartial tribunal for their citizens in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, due process analysis should consider whether a state's institutional structure threatens the impartiality of the criminal tribunal by failing adequately to separate executive and judicial responsibilities. Under the Dreyer doctrine, however, federal courts may not subject a state's separation of powers schemes to due process scrutiny. 4 This Note challenges that doctrine. It disputes the Court's view that federalism bars due process inquiry into the structure of state government, proposes how courts might determine when a state violates due process by too closely linking the executive and judicial functions, and concludes by illustrating how that proposal might be applied.
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
2. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127 (1965) (one of five primary justifications for separation of powers is to "assure that the laws are impartially administered"); M. RicrrER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MoNTESQuiEU 84-92 (1977) (guaranteeing impartial judge is one major justification for separation of powers).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Inadequate separation of legislative and judicial powers, or of legislative and executive powers, in state governments may also pose due process problems. This Note only considers cases of executive-judicial interlock, however, for two reasons. First, the Note's central contention is that courts must replace the Dreyer doctrine with a rule allowing some judicial examination of the due process implications of a state's government structure. Since the federal courts have often applied due process to state court proceedings, especially criminal proceedings, the executivejudicial nexus is the weakest facet of Dreyer. Second, cases of legislative-judicial interlock pose very different problems than cases of executive-judicial interlock. The problems of the former are often akin to those caused by bills of attainder, see infra note 49.
4. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) .
biased, 1 " whether or not a specific defendant can show the procedure actually biased the outcome in his particular case." Like most due process safeguards, the right to an impartial judge assumes special importance in criminal cases. The liberty interest has always received vigorous due process protection. 2 Furthermore, in an adversarial system in which the government acts as prosecutor, stiff procedural safeguards are necessary to shield the defendant from the state.
3

B. Separation of Executive and Judicial Powers: Guarantor of an Impartial Judge
Classical political theorists recognized that government structures that do not sufficiently separate executive and judicial powers create a high probability that the judge in a criminal suit will be biased. The executive, as the branch accusing the defendant, naturally desires to convict him. When the accusing branch can control or influence the judge, the judge's ability to objectively weigh the prosecution's case is endangered.' The 10. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (appearance of impartiality requirement prohibits trial before judge who previously held defendant in contempt); Marberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (same); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (justice must satisfy the appearance of justice).
11. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (judge hearing own contempt charges violates due process whether or not actual bias shown). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (neutrality requirement may bar trial before judge who has no actual bias); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245 (1977) (prohibiting paying justice of peace only when he or she issued search warrant, whether or not actual bias shown); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (prohibiting judge with pecuniary interest in fines collected by court from serving as judge, whether or not defendant can show actual bias); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (same).
12. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) (defendant's right to counsel tied to risk trial poses to his or her personal freedom); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (trials leading to loss of liberty different in kind and meriting greater due process safeguards than trials resulting in fines or threat of imprisonment); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974) (right to continued employment merits lesser protection than "elemental freedom from external restraint"); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (creating higher due process standard for prison parole hearing than for administrative hearing where liberty interest not at stake).
13. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) REv. 1031 REv. , 1032 REv. -40, 1052 REv. -59 (1975 (adversary system motivates state prosecutor to place far greater value on obtaining conviction than on discovering truth).
This Note considers only the dangers of executive and judicial interlock in criminal cases, because in most civil cases the executive has only a limited interest in the outcome. Obviously, that is not always the case. See People ex rel. Saranac Land and Timber v. Supreme Court Extraordinary Term, 220 N.Y. 487, 116 N.E. 384 (1917) (Extraordinary Term of New York Supreme Court called by Governor after plaintiff won three suits againit state for state lands). The argument advanced here may apply to some civil cases, but this extension presents conceptual problems that go beyond the scope of this Note. classical theorists recognized this threat both when the executive influences the judiciary and when the judiciary controls the executive." 5 The framers, also, feared these interrelated dangers and sought to avoid them in the Constitution. Their reliance on separation of powers stemmed from their belief that people are inherently self-serving and, therefore, that citizens cannot depend on the virtue of their officials to safeguard individual rights. 1 6 The framers sought to create a state that "economizes on virtue" 17 by dispersing power within the government, so that the selfish desires of individuals and branches would substitute "opposite and rival interests" for "better motives." 1 "
Separation of judicial and executive powers is, accordingly, crucial. If the judge can be "overpowered, awed or influenced" 9 by the executive, he will not provide a "steady, upright and impartial" 20 administration of the laws, nor will he check tyrannical or arbitrary prosecutions." 1 Conversely, if the judge holds "the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor," and enforce the law with bias. 2 Therefore, the framers sought to shelter the judiciary from undue executive influence by giving judges life tenure 2 " and guaranteed compensation. The framers also believed, however, that complete separation of powers is undesirable. An interlocking of the branches is necessary, so that the branches, without having control over the acts of each other, 25 can "by their mutual relations be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." 2 " Furthermore, while the framers emphasized the dangers of too closely linking executive and judicial functions, they also acknowledged that the article III safeguards are not the only means to preserve judicial independence. 27 The Federalist cited with approval state systems in which judges held office for limited terms, 2 8 were selected by the legislature, 29 or were nominated by the executive and confirmed by an elected governor's council. 30 To the framers, the critical question was whether a particular method of arranging a government created a system in which the branches checked each other, or whether it compromised the independence of a particular branch, thereby endangering the impartial administration of the law.
C. Separation of Powers as a Requirement of Due Process
The Supreme Court has often invalidated state government structures that endanger the due process rights to a fair trial and an impartial judge. Accordingly, state jury procedures, systems for paying judges, and for granting search warrants have been struck down, even though they were not shown to have caused any specific injustice. 31 Since systems that link judicial and executive powers threaten the impartiality of the judicial tribunal, the Fourteenth Amendment ought to require courts to consider whether a given state structure separates the two powers sufficiently to safeguard the individual's right to an impartial judge. The Supreme Court, however, not only refuses to decide what constitutes "sufficient" separation, but holds that federalism concerns preclude judicial inquiry into state separation of powers schemes. The Court has not applied the doctrine to another case of an allegedly inadequate separation of executive and judicial powers in a state criminal system,"' but, in dicta, has repeatedly restated the Dreyer doctrine. The doctrine has had a dramatic impact in state and lower federal courts. Dreyer has long been read as establishing that "separation of power principles do not apply to the States,' ' 1 and conclusory references 32. 187 U.S. 71 (1902 to the doctrine have served to refute arguments that the inadequate separation of executive and judicial powers endangers due process. 3 8 Accordingly, these courts have rejected (with brief and uncritical restatements of the Dreyer doctrine) allegations that federal due process is violated by state systems that allow the Governor to select a judge to hear a case of the Governor's choosing, 3 9 that require the District Attorney's consent before the judge can grant probation, 40 that give the prosecutor power to determine whether habitual criminals should receive enhanced sentences, 41 and that confer subpoena power on prosecuting attorneys. 2 Surprisingly, considering the impact the doctrine has had, the Supreme Court has provided little justification for it. In his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 4 3 Justice Frankfurter suggested the only justification for the Dreyer doctrine which any member of the Court has ever advanced. Permitting due process inquiry into state separation of powers arrangements, Frankfurter stated, would "make the deepest inroads upon our federal system."
44 Federalism, then, seems to be the barrier preventing due process inquiry from reaching state separation of powers arrangements.
B. Federalism: How Strong an Objection?
Frankfurter's terse remark in Sweezy restates his broad view that American federalism consists of two distinct systems, one federal and one state, each with its "proper domain," 45 and "distinctive operations" within its "respective sphere." '46 Frankfurter's or any other theory of federalism Supp. 1274 , 1277 (D. Kan. 1979 38. See Bean v. Nevada, 410 F. Supp. 963, 966 (D. Nev. 1974 ) (state board of pardons, made up of members of judicial and executive branches, not subject to due process challenge as violating separation of powers); State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 494, 164 S.E.2d 161, 165-66 (1968) ("It is for the State to determine whether and to what extent its powers shall be kept separate between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of its government," but relying on N.C Constitution to reduce discretion of commissioner of insurance to fine insurance agenct who violate N.C. law).
39 should not, however, bar due process inquiry into a state's system of separation of powers if that system threatens the federal right to an impartial judge. A state's decision to structure its government a certain way has never been a "sacred province of state autonomy ' 4 7 into which the federal courts could not pry. The ability of a state to structure its government has always been subject to federal constraints when the structure has endangered the right to an impartial tribunal. 4 At a minimum, for example, article I, section 10's ban on state bills of attainder and ex post facto laws seeks to guarantee an impartial tribunal by preventing an unfair "trial by legislature" during periods when the legislature is moved by "sudden and strong passions." 4 Given that the framers considered separation of powers so important that they used the federal Constitution to require partial separation of state legislative and judicial powers, one might ask why they did not impose similar safeguards regarding the executive and judicial powers. The answer lies in the framers' deference to states' rights. See Berger, supra; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 35 & 36 (U.
Madison). Federalism concerns were overridden, however, in the special case of bills of attainder because the framers believed that in a republic the legislature was the most powerful branch and therefore that many restraints on its power were necessary, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) ; THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 344 (U. Madison); Note, supra, at 343-48. Legislativejudicial interlock was therefore more frightening to the framers than executive-judicial interlock. Furthermore, the bill of attainder was the most obvious and easily identifiable form of inadequate separation of powers. No analogous form existed for executive-judicial interlock. This Note contends that the federalism balance has been so radically altered by the Fourteenth Amendment and its subsequent interpretation by the courts, that the framers' deference to states' rights can no longer protect executive-judicial interlock in state governments from due process scrutiny. federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty" which further limited states' freedom in structuring their governments. 5 " In fact, some scholars believe the amendment was adopted to serve precisely that purpose. 5 1 Furthermore, the court has, without expressly recognizing it, severely undermined the Dreyer doctrine by using the due process clause to bar egregious mergers of executive and judicial powers in which a single official wears both the executive and judicial hats in a criminal prosecution. an executive role can also endanger due process. The Court declared unconstitutional a Michigan procedure that allowed a judge to decide contempt charges he himself had brought on the grounds that the judge was serving in "his own case" by, in effect, assuming prosecutorial and judicial roles. 55 The Court never discussed the separation of powers implications of these decisions. Nor did it ever take the logical step of expanding these "two-hat" cases to situations in which one branch controls both executive and judicial functions. And, of course, it never recognized that the two-hat cases are an exception to the Dreyer doctrine. These cases do, however, 52. 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (due process bans mayor from judging suits because of mayor's "partisan" interest in filling town treasury and because portion of fines were added to mayor's salary); see also Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (mayor holding virtually no executive power lacks partisan interest in suit and so can serve as judge).
53. 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (due process bans mayor from judging traffic violation suits because of mayor's partisan interest in fining defendants to fill town treasury); see also must provide speedy trial, but courts will look to length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to defendant in determining whether that right has been denied).
75. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (holding that federalism does not bar Congress from applying age-discrimination legislation to state government).
eignty. This section proposes such an approach and illustrates how it might be applied.
A. The Proposal
Separation of powers doctrine identifies several interrelated characteristics of a state system that adequately separates executive and judicial powers. The system will economize on virtue by relying on fair procedures, rather than on honest office holders, to ensure that the executive lacks the ability unduly to influence the judiciary.
78
The analysis in the "two-hat" cases explains what constitutes "undue influence." In Tumey v. Ohio 77 the Court first stated that "[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge. . .not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law,"1 78 then forcefully observed that "[a] situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." ' 79 Separation of powers doctrine suggests the court must look to a complex set of factors to determine whether a specific state structure generates undue influence under the two-hat analysis. At the outset, the court must examine the nature of the interrelationship of the executive and judicial branches. The entwining of the two may simply realize the goal of separation of powers doctrine, that each branch have the means of checking the other. On the other hand, the interlock may be so tight that the judge is no longer an outsider impartially observing the executive's case, but has absorbed the executive's interest in conviction. The interlock may also pose due process dangers by granting the executive so much power over the judiciary that the executive can dictate or influence the judge's decision.
Second, the court must determine whether these shortcomings are serious enough to violate due process. In determining whether the state structure tempts the average person as judge sufficiently to render the balance between state and defense no longer "nice, clear and true," the court must 
79.
Id. at 534. The average-person standard does not conflict with situations in which judges are assumed to have more than the average person's ability to remain objective, such as after disallowing prejudicial evidence, or after guilty pleas have been withdrawn. In such cases, the judge is under no direct institutional pressure to decide the case on the executive's behalf. Furthermore, in some cases objectivity can be learned. The judge, for example, can remain objective after disallowing prejudicial evidence because he has learned to recognize the non-probative value of such evidence. determine whether the relationship between the branches is likely to bias the judge in actual cases. 80 This requires that the branch of the executive influencing the judge have a partisan interest in the outcome of the trial. Just as in other due process inquiries, however, the Court does not need to find actual bias in any specific case. The determination that a particular procedure creates a possibility of bias would be sufficient to establish its unconstitutionality.
Admittedly, due process scrutiny of state separation of executive and judicial powers may require a difficult weighing of competing factors. But it requires no more weighing than most other due process inquiries and certainly no more than the "two-hat" analysis already applied in Tumey, Ward and Murchison." 1 Although the boundaries of constitutionally permissible state structures are broad, they are not limitless. Courts must police those limits.
B. The Standard Applied
The most significant advantage of overruling Dreyer is that potentially dangerous state systems, perhaps as yet undeveloped, can be subjected to due process scrutiny. The result in Dreyer, however, would not change. Though the Illinois State Board of Pardons was technically an executive body that decided whether a prisoner should be released, 2 it had no partisan interest in the outcome of the hearing, nor was it alleged to be subject to influence from any individual who did. 8 Nev. 1974 ) (state board of pardons made up of executive and judicial branches not subject to due process challenge as violating separation of powers). The board was not alleged to have a "partisan" interest in the outcome of its adjudication. Furthermore, in Bean, executive control over the decision was tempered by judicial presence on the board. ever, which have been protected by the Dreyer doctrine would fare less well. 8 "
Executive Power Over the Judiciary
Systems of executive selection and removal of judges potentially raise serious problems, 85 but most states that place the selection and removal powers in executive hands structure the procedure so as to reduce the executive's ability to influence or control the judiciary.
8 6 Most such states require the legislature or an elected "governor's council" to approve the judges nominated by the governor. 8 " Furthermore, the judges' lengthy 84. The Arkansas statute upheld in Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.) aff d, per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1969), which conferred subpoena power upon prosecuting attorneys, would fail the test. The attorney would naturally be prone to make a biased decision as to whether a given document was relevant to his investigation. The California Penal Code provision requiring approval by the prosecuting attorney before judge can grant probation, upheld in Chromiak v. Fields, 406 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1969 502 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 502 (9th Cir. (1970 , has been repealed by the California legislature, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1982) . It would probably also fall under the proposed standard. The executive interest in sentencing is not as pronounced as the executive interest in conviction. Nonetheless, the executive's adversarial relationship with the defendant might bias the attorney toward demanding strict sentences for convicted defendants. Similarly, the Nebraska statute upheld in Martin v. Parratt, 412 F. Supp. 544, 549 (D.C. Neb. 1976 ) (Nebraska habitual criminal statute allowing prosecutors to seek mandatory enhanced sentences for habitual criminals) would survive only if it left prosecutors minimal discretion to decide whether to bring the fact that the criminal was a habitual offender to the attention of the judge. Under the Nebraska law, once the judge knew the defendant was a habitual offender, the sentence was mandatory.
85. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, (A. Hamilton) (greatest threat to separation of powers posed when one branch has power to appoint and remove members of another branch).
A test analogous to the one proposed here would not invalidate state systems of elected judiciaries, though such an outcome would satisfy many scholars who argue that elected judiciaries pose due process problems. See A. STuRM (1959) . Elected judiciaries should be distinguished from fusions of executive and judicial powers on several grounds. First, the electorate does not hold a "partisan" interest in convicting a particular defendant. If the electorate were essentially deciding a case by referendum, or if the judge ran on a platform of convicting a particular defendant, most agree that due process problems would arise. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 494-95 (1978) . Second, most systems of elected judiciaries have extensive safeguards to prevent popular pressures biasing the judge. The Missouri system, adopted by the majority of states with elected judiciaries, requires nomination of a list of candidates for judges' positions by a legislative committee, a selection of the nominee by the governor, and confirmation by the people. See A. STURM, MODERNIZING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1973) . Third, the people are the source of power in state constitutions. Their decision to directly elect their officers carries much weight. It is far less likely that the people are aware of the specific intermingling of executive and judicial powers developed by their state governments. Fourth, long usage supports elected judiciaries. Most state governments, on the other hand, do not entwine the executive and judicial powers so as to endanger the due process right to an impartial tribunal. The institutional pressures against changing the system of elected judiciaries are, therefore, far more pronounced than the pressures supporting judicial and executive merger. 89 further reduce executive influence. New York, however, creates a system of executive appointment of judges, which, though it has been upheld in reliance on Dreyer, 9 " raises serious due process problems. The New York Constitution allows the Governor to select the judge to hear a specific case at a specific time.
1
The Governor's decision to hold the Extraordinary Term, his selection of the case to be heard, and of the judge to hear it, are not reviewable.
2
Executive selection of judges for specific cases bypasses the safeguards against bias, such as legislative oversight of the Governor's decision and lengthy judicial terms, found in other state systems. The Governor has the ability to influence the outcome of the case by selecting a judge who will handle it the way the Governor wishes. The fact that the Governor selected a specific case for adjudication suggests he may hold a partisan interest in the outcome. Indeed, the cases decided by Extraordinary Terms in New York have been sensational murders, 93 investigations into official corruption, 94 or similar cases in which the state has a peculiar interest over and above its ordinary concern in criminal cases. Allegations of judicial bias in cases heard in Extraordinary Terms are common.
5 Even if the allegations are unfounded, they suggest that the system creates the possibility and appearance of bias. This appearance of bias, together with the risk that inadequate separation of executive and judicial powers will allow the Governor, holding a partisan interest in the outcome of the suit, to exercise sufficient control over the judiciary to bias a judge, suggests that the Term violates due process."
Judicial Control Over the Executive
Judicial involvement in the prosecution of a case can also give a judge a partisan role in a criminal suit. Connecticut's recently reformed system of states' attorneys was a case in point, which, under the Dreyer doctrine, was shielded from due process scrutiny. 7 Until 1984 the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court appointed the Chief State's Attorney. 8 The judges of the superior court ap- 976 (1974) , asserted that the system functioned effectively for 270 years with no prejudice to those accused of criminal offenses, id. at 570, 325 A.2d at 207, and found no violation of Connecticut Constitution art. II (requiring separation of powers in state government) because state's attorneys are officers of the court, whose role is to see that impartial justice is done, id. at 569, 325 A.2d at 206. Neither of the Court's arguments is persuasive. First, its assertion that the accused have not been prejudiced by the Connecticut system is belied by studies of the system. See CrTZENS CRIME COM- 4-5 (1984) Cir. 1960 ) (no due process violation arises when the judge selects public defenders). The Richmond situation is not analogous to judicial selection of prosecutors because: (a) the due process requirement that defendants receive a fair trial suggests that judicial bias in favor of a criminal defendant is less serious than bias against a defendant; and (b) judicial selection of a defender implements a constitutional right to counsel. No constitutional right is involved in judicial selection of a prosecutor.
MISSION OF CONNECTICUT, REPORT ON THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-278 (b) (1) (West Supp. 1982) . In November 1984, Connecticut amended its constitution to provide that a Criminal Justice Commission, selected by the Governor pointed the state's attorneys for their judicial districts," 9 determining how many assistants the states' attorneys needed, appointing deputy and assistant states attorneys to fill that need, 100 setting the deputies, and assistants' salaries, reappointing the attorneys after their four year terms, 1 01 and, through a committee of Superior Court judges, removing the attorneys from office when necessary. 10 2
The opportunity for judges in this system to become too closely involved in the prosecution is obvious. The extent to which judges actually did so was a subject of much debate in Connecticut." 0 It has been suggested that under the Connecticut system the judge in effect decided what cases would be brought and how they would be pleaded.'" To the extent this was true, the judges had become intimately involved in the prosecution's case. Such intimate involvement creates the possibility that the judge would no longer be able to view that case with an impartial, detached eye. It thereby violated due process.
CONCLUSION
This Note provides a way to subject dangerous state systems such as New York's Extraordinary Term and Connecticut's judicial appointment of prosecutors to due process scrutiny. Courts should not dismiss difficult due process problems posed by inadequate separation of judicial and executive powers in state government with short, uncritical references to Dreyer. Separation of powers principles flow naturally into the current of modern due process analysis. The Supreme Court should allow their merger by providing for due process review of state separation of executive and judicial functions in criminal prosecutions. 103. See CmzENs CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 97, at 1 (consensus in Connecticut government that procedure for selecting states attorneys must be modified).
-David
104. Newman, supra note 97, at 569; CrrizEus CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 97, at 4 (judge biased by Connecticut system).
